A conception of "refugee" is not, strictly speaking, a definition. There are in fact dozens of definitions in effect within various jurisdictions.2 Most states have their own municipal definitions, the majority of which follow the construction of the UN Convention. The germane passage of that instrument defines a refugee as a person who, "owing to a wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such a fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."3 Such concrete definitions are predicated on an implicit argument (or conception) that: a) a bond of trust, loyalty, protection, and assistance between the citizen and the state constitutes the normal basis of society;4 b) in the case of the refugee, this bond has been severed; c) persecution and alienage are always the physical manifestations of this severed bond;5 and d) these manifestations are the necessary and sufficient conditions for determining refugeehood.
Thus the conception supplies the theoretical basis for the definition.
It stipulates what is essential and universal about refugeehood. It asserts both a moral and an empirical claim. Moral, because it posits the existence of a normal, minimal relation of rights and duties between the citizen and the state, the negation of which engenders refugees. Empirical, because it asserts that the actual consequences of this severed bond are always persecution and alienage.
The definition of "refugee" adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is the only salient challenge to the proposition that persecution is an essential criterion of refugeehood. That definition, after incorporating the United Nations' persecution-based phraseology, proceeds to state that: "The term 'refugee' shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously 2. See Grahl-Madsen, vol. 1, chap. 1, for an elaboration of the meaning of "refugee" in various Western European and North American statutes.
3. Convention, art. 1A(2). 4. Grahl-Madsen uses this language explicitly (see Grahl-Madsen, vol. 1, pp. 73-100). 5. For a discussion of the meaning of "persecution," see United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Geneva, 1979), p. 14, which states: "From Article 33 of the 1951 [Refugee] Convention, it may be inferred that a threat to life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group is always persecution. Other serious violations of human rights -for the same reasons -would also constitute persecution." While Grahl-Madsen asserted in 1966 that persecution applies exclusively to acts perpetrated by states, governments now also consider the violence of nonstate actors as persecution (see vol. 1, p. 82). The term "alienage" refers here to "a person who is outside the country of his nationality, or if he has no nationality, the country of his former habitual residence" (Convention, art. IA [2]).
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January 1985 disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of nationality."6 Clearly, the OAU and the UN definitions reflect markedly different historical contexts. The latter was a response to the European totalitarian experience when, indeed, refugees were primarily the persecuted victims of highly organized predatory states. Regrettably, similar states still exist, and the OAU definition provides for them. But the OAU definition recognizes, as the UN definition does not, that the normal bond between the citizen and the state can be severed in diverse ways, persecution being but one. Societies periodically disintegrate because of their fraility rather than because of their ferocity, victims of domestic division or foreign intervention. Much of what I say here implicitly supports the OAU conception.
A proper conception of refugeehood is an important matter. The international community's clumsy, ad hoc responses to refugee emergencies are, of course, primarily due to the reluctance of sovereign states to grant political deference and financial support to the relevant international agencies, their hesitancy in assuming the burdens of material relief, asylum, and resettlement, and their concern that assisting refugees could adversely implicate other foreign policy objectives. However, the problem is only partially attributable to political conflicts and resource scarcity, for conceptual confusion-about the meaning of refugeehood, its causes, and its management-also contributes to the misery of both refugee and host and to the inflammation of international tension.
An overly narrow conception of "refugee" will contribute to the denial of international protection to countless people in dire circumstances whose claim to assistance is impeccable.7 Ironically, for many persons on the brink of disaster, refugee status is a privileged position. In contrast to other destitute people, the refugee is eligible for many forms of international assistance, including material relief, asylum, and permanent resettlement. Conversely, an overly inclusive conception is also morally suspect and will, in addition, financially exhaust relief programs and impune the credibility of the refugee's privileged position among host populations, whose support is crucial for the viability of international assistance programs.
6. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, adopted September 10, 1969 (UNTS no. 14691), art. 1(2).
7. Currently, approximately 90,000 persons are fleeing starvation in Mozambique and crossing into Zimbabwe, yet the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and other agencies are not mobilizing on their behalf. The rationale is that these persons are not victims of persecution and therefore do not come under the mandate of the High Commission's Statute. The reluctance of the international community to offer its assistance not only condemns these persons to yet more suffering but also forces Zimbabwe, whose own population is starving, to offer asylum unilaterally, thus further contributing to the destabilization of Southern Africa.
Whether states and international agencies are obligated to assist refugees is a crucial, but separate, issue from the one at hand. A conception of refugeehood is prior to a theory and policy of entitlements and is, I believe, sufficiently important and controversial to warrant independent analysis. If obligations do exist, then the persons described here have the strongest claim to such assistance. Frequently, states reason in reverse from their fear that they will be forced to shoulder the burden of assisting refugees unilaterally to a narrow conception of refugeehood which limits the number of claimants. In so doing, they are attempting to resolve what is in fact a procedural and institutional problem by a legalistic sleight of hand. I intend to address exclusively the meaning of "refugee," deferring for now a discussion of obligation and management.
My contention is that neither persecution nor alienage captures what is essential about refugeehood. Persecution is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for the severing of the normal social bond. It accounts for the absence of state protection under tyrannical conditions where a government is predatory but says nothing about the opposite, chaotic, extreme where a government (or society) has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist. Persecution is but one manifestation of a broader phenomenon: the absence of state protection of the citizen's basic needs. It is this absence of state protection which constitutes the full and complete negation of society and the basis of refugeehood. The same reasoning which justifies the persecutee's claim to refugeehood justifies the claims of persons deprived of all other basic needs as well.
Similarly, alienage is an unnecessary condition for establishing refugee status. It, too, is a subset of a broader category: the physical access of the international community to the unprotected person.8 The refugee need not necessarily cross an international frontier to gain such access. Thus I shall argue that refugees are, in essence, persons whose basic needs are unprotected by their country of origin, who have no remaining recourse other than to seek international restitution of their needs, and who are so situated that international assistance is possible. Because this alternative conception of refugeehood accounts more comprehensively than does the current notion for the dual extremes of tyranny and chaos which threaten the normal, minimal bonds of society, it has a stronger claim to moral validity. Moreover, it accounts more exactly for those persons who are in fact taxing asylum states and furthering the erosion of minimum order in Lebanon, El Salvador, and elsewhere throughout the world.
REFUGEES AND THE MINIMAL SOCIAL BOND
With the proponents of the current conception of refugeehood, I take as my point of departure the assumption that morally (if not in fact) a 8. By "access" I mean, literally,, the ability of states or international agencies to supply the requisite material or diplomatic assistance unimpeded by the government of the country of origin, insurrectionists, invading nation, or other powers.
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January 1985 normal, minimal bond of trust, loyalty, protection, and assistance has always existed between virtually every human being and some larger collectivity-be it clan, feudal manor, or modern state-and that the refugee is spawned when these minimal bonds are ruptured. What I object to is the conclusion that persecution and alienage are the necessary and sufficient indices of this dissolved union. The negation of society takes many forms and is frequently altogether unrelated to persecution and alienage. In order to view the negation of society in all of its manifestations, we must first identify the normal, positive relation between the citizen and the state. A political commonwealth is formed on the premise that people experience a generalized condition of insecurity when outside the protective confines of society.9 People wish to reduce their vulnerability to a variety of threats, including the violent acts of others, resource scarcity, and natural disasters. However, it is only reasonable of them to join in common to fend against man-made threats, for it would be incongruently illogical to expect social institutions to contend with sources of vulnerability beyond human control. Even in a well-ordered society, insecurity will persist. Only because human beings, taken all around, are roughly equal in strength and cunning is it sensible for them voluntarily to forbear aggressive acts against each other in return for a cooperative effort against transgressors. Thus the primary purpose of civil society is to reduce each person's vulnerability to every other.
In refugee policy circles, basic threats to the individual are usually divided into three categories: persecution, vital (economic) subsistence, and natural calamities.'0 Refugeehood is said to result only from acts of persecution. I shall look in turn at each of these three categories of deprivation and argue that, for purposes of defining "refugee," the distinction between them is neither bright nor clear, that all of them can equally violate the citizen's irreducible rationale for entering society, and that each may constitute a sufficient condition for refugeehood.
The sine qua non of the political commonwealth is to defend the citizen "from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another."" When a citizen becomes a victim of a predatory sovereign, society is undermined by the very institution created to guarantee its survival. However, it is not enough that sovereigns refrain from aggressive actions Similarly, Sen has demonstrated that the weather and other natural factors actually played fairly minor roles in the Great Bengal Famine. When starvation occurs not because of drought or flood but because of the hoarding of grain or the corrupt distribution of material aid, deprivation is no longer the result of natural conditions. To the extent that a lifethreatening situation occurs because of human actions rather than natural causes, the state has left unfulfilled its basic duty to protect the citizen from the actions of others. All other human rights are meaningless when starvation results from the neglect or malice of the local regime. Thus, in some dire circumstances, what appears on the surface to be the result of natural forces may, on closer scrutiny, reveal state negligence or indifference. As with threats to physical security, when the state is unwilling to unable to protect a citizen from the life-threatening actions of others, the basis for a legitimate claim to refugeehood is generated.
Threats to vital subsistence are subject to the same logic.'" To the extent that such threats to the survival of the citizen are due to human actions, they, like security threats and supposed "natural" calamities, create legitimate claims for state protection. It is often asserted that the state cannot be obligated to provide for the minimal subsistence of its citizens because doing so may require access to resources beyond the state's control. Indeed, where subsistence is threatened because of a genuine resource scarcity (like the absence of adequate arable land), the citizen cannot legitimately demand basic sustenance from the state. However, the satisfaction of subsistence needs is only in part a function of resource availability. There are at least three other necessary conditions for the fulfillment of subsistence needs: a) a technology for processing resources, b) an infrastructure for facilitating commerce, and c) a method of distribution.
All three of these conditions are subject to human control and often threaten subsistence more acutely than a genuine scarcity of resources. None necessarily requires extensive capital investment, specialized knowledge, heroic governmental efforts, or saintly sacrifices by the local affluent in order to sustain a minimal level of subsistence. A hoe may be an altogether satisfactory tool for processing a resource, and a footpath may suffice as a conduit for commerce. Similarly, a minimally satisfactory method of distribution (where no one suffers from a severe protein/ caloric deficiency) is consistent with extensive inequalities of wealth. In situations where subsistence is threatened because of inadequacies in technology, infrastructure, or distribution-all factors within human control-the state has failed to perform its basic duty to protect its citizens 15. For a thorough and penetrating treatment of the similarities between the rights to security and to subsistence, see Shue, pp. 13-34. from the actions of others.'6 When subsistence is in fact threatened by one or another of these conditions, a justifiable claim to refugeehood results. 17 
REFUGEES AND BASIC NEEDS
In exchange for their allegiance, citizens can minimally expect that their government will guarantee physical security, vital subsistence, and liberty of political participation and physical movement."8 No reasonable person would be satisfied with less. Beneath this threshold the social compact has no meaning. Thus, refugees must be persons whose home state has failed to secure their basic needs. There is no justification for granting refugee status to individuals who do not suffer from the absence of one or more of these needs. Nor is there reason for denying refugee status to those who do. Moreover, because all of these needs are equally essential for survival, the violation of each constitutes an equally valid claim to refugeehood.
For many concerned with refugee affairs, raising the standard of basic needs is a frightening specter. Perhaps the criterion of persecution is too narrow, but, they would argue, a conception of refugeehood tied to basic needs is surely too broad. Half the world will become bona fide refugees overnight, refugee programs will be indistinguishable from development programs, and the international machinery which now protects thousands of people will become so overburdened that all stand to lose. These arguments must be taken seriously because the international regime for attending to the needs of refugees is fragile and can be shattered as much by premature cosmopolitanism as by enduring primordial sentiments. A broader conception of refugeehood has utility only if strategies of response to refugee emergencies are similarly broad, where transnational procedures and institutions replace the current, predominantly unilateral ones. Notice, however, that none of these objections contests the conceptual validity of the claim that refugees are victims of states which have failed 16 . In most societies, including most developing ones, the state increasingly controls infrastructure, technology, and distribution. This assumption of responsibility often directly implicates the state in creating conditions which foster refugees. For a discussion of the growing role of the state in developing societies, see Alfred C. Stepan, The State and Society (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978).
17. The assurance of the citizen's minimal preservation and thus the minimal legitimacy of the state require an environment conducive to subsistence. Often, if left to their own devices and free from external impediments, people will, indeed, sustain themselves. By logical implication, when they are not left to their own devices, or when the environment, because of human causes, is insufficiently mild to allow them by their own industry to secure subsistence, the state has failed to meet its minimal responsibilities, and the social bond has been broken.
18. By "vital subsistence" is meant unpolluted air and water, adequate food, clothing, and shelter, and minimal preventative health care (see Shue, p. 19). The reason for accepting political participation and liberty of movement as basic needs is that both are necessary if effective institutions for self-protection, the ultimate barrier against the deprivation of security and subsistence, are to be built and maintained (ibid., p. 23).
to protect their basic needs. The conceptual problem at hand is logically and politically antecedent to the procedural and institutional issues raised by these arguments. Yet one conceptual issue remains: Are all persons deprived of their basic needs refugees?
The answer, in short, is no. An unmet basic need is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for refugeehood: all refugees have been deprived of one or more of their basic needs, though not all persons so deprived are refugees. What separates these two groups of equally destitute persons is their differing positions vis-a'-vis the international community. Most individuals deprived of their basic needs are prevented by their government (or other forces) from seeking international assistance. To the contrary, a refugee is, in essence, a person whose government fails to protect his basic needs, who has no remaining recourse than to seek international restitution of these needs, and who is so situated that international assistance is possible.
Thus it is not a matter of entitlements that distinguishes refugees from all other persons whose basic needs are unmet by their home government but a matter of dissimilar objective conditions. Refugees, unlike all others deprived of their basic needs, have a well-founded fear that recourse to their own government is futile and are, in addition, within reach of the international community (see fig. 1 ).
At this point, the time-honored criterion of alienage falters. For centuries, the migratory crossing of an international frontier has been considered an essential characteristic of the refugee. The origins of this criterion stem from the positivistic legal norm which asserts that states have equal, inviolable sovereign integrity and that the intervention in the internal affairs of one state will reduce stability for all. The corollary of this proposition in the context of refugee affairs is that a victim could only become an international ward when beyond the reach of the oppressive home government. Moreover, the taking leave of one's country is said to be a clear indication that the normal bond between the citizen and 
